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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of different mathematical formulations of the problem of optimal design of electrical machines on the results obtained using a local optimization solver. The aim is to investigate the efficiency and reliability of standard local solvers when handling different mathematical formulations. This could provide guidelines for designers in practical engineering applications.

The paper proposes six equivalent mathematical formulations of the optimal design problem of a slotless permanent‐magnet electric rotating machine. The authors investigate the impact of these different mathematical formulations on the results obtained using a local optimization solver which is well‐known in the engineering community: MatLab's fmincon function. The paper first computationally compares the six proposed formulations with a fixed value for the number of pole pairs p, that gives continuous optimization problems, then discusses some results when p is free on three mixed‐integer formulations.

The paper shows that, even though the considered formulations are mathematically equivalent, their numerical performances are different when an optimization solver, such as the one proposed by MatLab in fmincon, is used. Thus, the designer must take care about the formulation of the design problem in order to make more efficient the use of these kind of algorithms.

In the context of engineering applications, one usually resorts to well known and easy to use optimization solvers. The same optimization problem can be often formulated in different ways. Furthermore, the formal description of optimization problems has an impact on the applicability and efficiency of the corresponding solution methods. This is usually not taken into account when optimization solvers are exploited. The originality of this paper is in building on the theory of reformulations in mathematical optimization to investigate and highlight the impact of formulation differences.

In previous efforts I have dated the birth of (modern) Social Catholicism (alias: Roman‐Catholic Social Economycs) with the publication of the closely associated works of Charles de Coux (1832) and Alban de Villeneuve‐Bargemont (1834/37). If indeed (and without going all the way back to Jesus of Nazareth, via Thomas Aquinas, Jerome and Ambrose et al.) that be the case, and the implication of the present assignment be correct, then we should have to date the “birth of solidarism” in the Social‐Catholic vein identically. Undaunted by Gide's virtual declaration that “they were all solidarists then”, this is what we set out to show, viz. that our Solidarism did have its birth therewith.

It says something of the current state of public discourse that the inclusion of a paper on the social teachings of an organized religion as part of a Conference on Ethico‐Economics must be explained. Theology and Religion, once at the center of any discourse on public policy, has become marginalized in such discussions. There are those who associate the decline of theology with the era of the Cold War. That conclusion is at least debatable. “Economic Man”, in the context of the post‐war period, was very much a social being for whom government and public institutions, a pro‐Keynesian economics, were essential allies. Adam Smith, accepted as the founder of classical Economics, wrote his seminal work, The Wealth of Nations, when he was Professor of Moral Philosophy. Smith's concept of markets was framed as a social and ethical instrument. The Reagan and Thatcher regimes did succeed in undermining economic policy as a social instrument to the extent that most industrial nations and the important international organizations now give pre‐eminence to the balanced budget as the vehicle for corporate interests. The elimination of deficits and the efficacy of financial markets are seen in some quarters not only as ends in themselves but also as means to facilitate each other. The critics of these policies are presently weak and unpopular but they are not silent. This disparate group between them embrace a range of social, cultural, and ethical values. They seek to establish that some ends and some means must be rejected as being ethically unacceptable. It is this context that this paper seeks to position the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.

Introduction On 15 May 1891 Pope Leo XIII issued what has become known as “the Great Social Encyclical”, Rerum Novarum: De Conditione Opificum; or, “Revolutionary Change: On the Condition of the Working Classes”. Forty years thereafter, Pope Pius XI issued the second GSE, Quadragesimo Anno: On the Restoration of the Social Order (15 May 1931); and, in a string of papal pronouncements (allocutions, encyclical epistles and letters, etc.) and related Vatican documents ranging from Pius XII's brief Sertum laetitiae (1 Nov. 1939) and Radio Address of Pentacost 1941 celebrating the 50th anniversary of RN, e.g. via John XXIII's Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris (1961; 1963), …, John Paul II's Laborem Exercens: On Human Work and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: On Social Concern (1981; 1987), official “Social Catholicism” has continued to address itself to the so‐called “social question” over this near‐century. It is thus with some anticipation, and the prediction of a prominent US ordinary, that we await a major social encyclical letter on the 100th anniversary of Rerum Novarum, perhaps with the opening words and title, Centesimo Anno: On the Social Question Today.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.

Although bankruptcies in the TMT sector are flowing thick and fast, the collapse of the media empire built up by Leo Kirch over a 42‐year period is arguably the most dramatic. Protected by its links with German business and financial institutions as well as politicians, the KirchGruppe appeared to be impervious to the periodic downturns in business conditions. However, not only did the “German” way of doing business behind closed doors come under increasing pressure by the end of the 1990s, but the KirchGruppe acquired enemies such as the Springer family as well as shareholders, such as Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi, who were intent upon expanding their own empires. Because he assumed that his empire was well‐protected via his associates, Leo Kirch took excessive risks, not least the issuance of put options which, if exercised, could bring down his empire – which in the event was what transpired earlier this year.

In the US minimum wages were initially enacted by individual states, beginning with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1912. These laws were modeled on legislation enacted over the previous two decades in Australia, New Zealand, and England (Fisher, 1926, chap. 8; Hammond, 1915, 1913; Hobson, 1915; Hart, 1994, chaps. 2 & 3; Morris, 1986). From 1912 to 1923, the legislatures of 16 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia passed minimum wage legislation, although not all of them were operational by the end of this period (Brandeis, 1935, p. 501; Clark, 1921; Millis & Montgomery, 1938, chap. 6; Morris, 1930, chap. 1).

What does it mean in practice to claim a right? Does claiming a right add to the persuasive power of political demands? Does it clothe political demands with a moral urgency, setting such claims apart from the ordinary class of interests? In examining these questions, I suggest that in practice rights’ claims add little to political discourse. This is because Americans equate their policy preferences with rights. I find scant evidence for the belief that Americans have sufficient knowledge of rights to make them meaningful or that pronouncements of rights have persuasive power or imbue issues with heightened moral legitimacy.